Joshua Dunn – Education Next https://www.educationnext.org A Journal of Opinion and Research About Education Policy Thu, 20 Jul 2023 17:03:41 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=5.4.2 https://i2.wp.com/www.educationnext.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/e-logo-1.png?fit=32%2C32&ssl=1 Joshua Dunn – Education Next https://www.educationnext.org 32 32 181792879 The Education Exchange: “Quotas Masquerading as a Holistic Review” https://www.educationnext.org/the-education-exchange-quotas-masquerading-as-a-holistic-review/ Mon, 10 Jul 2023 08:50:14 +0000 https://www.educationnext.org/?p=49716742 After high court's decision on affirmative action in college admissions, preferences for alumni children are targeted

The post The Education Exchange: “Quotas Masquerading as a Holistic Review” appeared first on Education Next.

]]>

Photo of Joshua DunnThe executive director of the University of Tennessee, Knoxville’s Institute of American Civics at the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy, Joshua Dunn, joins Paul E. Peterson to discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard and Students for Fair Admissions v. University of North Carolina, which ends the use of race in college admissions.

Dunn’s article, “High Court Decision in College Admissions Case Has K-12 Implications,” is available now at EducationNext.org.

The post The Education Exchange: “Quotas Masquerading as a Holistic Review” appeared first on Education Next.

]]>
49716742
High Court Decision in College Admissions Case Has K-12 Implications https://www.educationnext.org/harvard-unc-admissions-k-12-effects-supreme-court/ Thu, 29 Jun 2023 20:43:31 +0000 https://www.educationnext.org/?p=49716732 Considering race in school assignment will become even harder after Harvard, UNC lose

The post High Court Decision in College Admissions Case Has K-12 Implications appeared first on Education Next.

]]>
A man holds a sign saying “Fix K–12 do not scapegoat Asians” at a rally against affirmative action and racial discrimination against Asian American students in college admissions. The rally was held one day before arguments were heard at the Supreme Court about a related case.

In 2007, Chief Justice John Roberts famously declared in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle that “the way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” In Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) v. Harvard and Students for Fair Admissions v. University of North Carolina, the Supreme Court moves much closer to Roberts’s position on racial discrimination. The court’s ruling, announced June 29, 2023, will have significant effects on college admissions policies and on K–12 education.

SFFA, an organization created by Edward Blum, had contended that Harvard’s use of race in college admissions violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbids racial discrimination by any entity receiving federal money. UNC, SFFA argued, violated not only Title VI but also, as a state institution, the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The Supreme Court agreed with both claims. The court combined both cases under SFFA v. Harvard but focused its analysis solely on the 14th Amendment. Previously it had held that a violation of the Equal Protection Clause would also constitute a violation of Title VI for institutions receiving federal funds; hence, the court’s equal protection analysis was sufficient to decide both cases.

Echoing his opinion in Parents Involved, Roberts concluded in his majority opinion that “eliminating racial discrimination means eliminating all of it.” Joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett, he offered three primary reasons for ruling against Harvard and UNC: their programs 1) “lack sufficiently focused and measurable objectives warranting the use of race,” 2) “unavoidably employ race in a negative manner, involve racial stereotyping,” and 3) “lack meaningful end points.”

With the first, since racial classifications are inherently suspect and must be given strict scrutiny, the compelling interest claimed by the institutions and the means of accomplishing them must be measurable. Harvard’s and UNC’s goals, Roberts said, were “commendable” but inherently “elusive” and “imprecise.”

On the second, Roberts said that the court had previously ruled that race could never be used as a negative factor in evaluating a student for admission. Both Harvard’s and UNC’s admissions programs did so, according to the court, effectively penalizing students who were not Black or Hispanic. Perhaps most important, though, it’s difficult to see how any use of race in admissions could survive, as admissions is, as Roberts pointed out, a “zero-sum” game. If it’s used as a plus factor that leads to one student being admitted, someone else who is not admitted because they do not have that plus factor inevitably suffers. Even though the court did not explicitly declare that it was overturning 2003’s Grutter v. Bollinger, which said that diversity was, temporarily, a compelling interest justifying the use of race in admissions, that opinion seems to be overturned in fact.

The court’s third reason, though, might have been the most important. Roberts pointed out that the court had clearly indicated in Grutter that affirmative action must have an end point. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, in fact, said, “We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary.” Even if for some reason that 25-year mark could not have been met, it would have been smart for Harvard and UNC to at least offer a tentative date. Their refusal to do so at any point in the litigation looks like a catastrophic miscalculation. At oral argument a couple of the conservative justices appeared sympathetic to the idea that universities should have some flexibility to bring the use of racial preferences to a close on their own if they could point to reasonable time frame for doing so. But the message the majority took from Harvard and UNC’s obstinance was that universities could not be trusted to work toward eliminating racial preferences on their own. “There is no reason to believe,” Roberts said, “that respondents will—even acting in good faith—comply with the Equal Protection Clause any time soon.”

The majority also appeared concerned that colleges and universities deeply committed to racial preferences would try to evade their ruling by adopting facially neutral admissions policies that nevertheless had a discriminatory effect. Much of the court’s reasoning seemed designed to warn universities that engaging in various evasions would only put them in more legal jeopardy. Roberts said, “universities may not simply establish through application essays or other means the regime we hold unlawful today.” He said further that the ruling does not prohibit “universities from considering an applicant’s discussion of how race affected his or her life” but then gave specific examples of how that must be done. For instance, “A benefit to a student who overcame racial discrimination, for example, must be tied to that student’s courage and determination. Or a benefit to a student whose heritage or culture motivated him or her to assume a leadership role or attain a particular goal must be tied to that student’s unique ability to contribute to the university.”

For universities, this likely means that admissions programs tightly constructed to increase socioeconomic diversity would survive legal scrutiny. However, if socioeconomic plans ended up leading to consistent percentages across racial groups across multiple admissions cycles, the court would be inclined to rule against them. In short, anything that looks like it is giving a systematic advantage based on race would be suspect. As well, if a school were to announce publicly that it was switching to a socioeconomic plan for the purpose of maintaining racial diversity, that would also be unconstitutional under today’s decision. Facially neutral programs that nevertheless have a discriminatory effect or were intended to have a discriminatory effect have long been considered unlawful.

The three members of the court’s current liberal bloc, Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ketanji Brown Jackson, dissented. Jackson offered a separate dissent since she had recused herself from the Harvard case in light of her recent service on Harvard’s board of overseers. Sotomayor, joined by Kagan and Jackson, accused the majority of “roll[in]g back decades of precedent and momentous progress.” In a biting dissent, Jackson said the majority’s opinion suffered from a “let-them-eat-cake obliviousness” that disregarded the ways race still matters in American life.

For K–12 education, the court’s rulings should settle once and for all whether school districts can use race in policies assigning students to schools. In Parents Involved, the majority had ruled that race could not be used. However, in a famously inscrutable controlling concurring opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy had said that while the policies struck down by the court were unconstitutional, he was unwilling to foreclose the possibility of a school district fashioning a constitutionally acceptable policy. This led some, including the Obama administration’s Department of Education, to treat the four dissenters in the case along with Kennedy’s concurrence as a majority opinion. Today’s opinion clearly eliminates that as a possibility.

The opinion will also affect ongoing litigation around magnet schools such as Thomas Jefferson High School for Science and Technology in Fairfax County, Virginia. In the wake of the George Floyd protests in 2020, the school district changed the admissions plan for the school. The previous admissions policy required students to take a rigorous entrance exam to gain admission to the school, which has been consistently ranked as one of the best high schools in the country. However, the board desired to racially balance the school to make it more closely reflect the demographics of the school district. To do so, it adopted a facially neutral “holistic” admissions policy. In the last year under the old system based on grades and a standardized test, Asian-American students comprised 73 percent of the admitted students. Under the first year under the new system, that percentage dropped to 54 percent.

The new policy was challenged in federal court by the Coalition for TJ, a group of district parents. The district court ruled in their favor, but that decision was overturned by a Fourth Circuit panel this May.

The author of the appellate decision, Judge Robert King, had ruled that the new policy did not harm Asian students and “visits no racially disparate impact on Asian American students. Indeed, those students have had greater success in securing admission to TJ under the policy than students from any other racial or ethnic group.” The assertion that a drop of 19 percentage points doesn’t have a disparate impact on you because there are still more of you than others is not something that will survive in light of today’s ruling.

Moving forward, this certainly does not mean the end of litigation either at the college or K–12 level. However, if a university wants to adopt a “holistic” admissions policy, it would be well-advised to make sure that no one in its administration or admissions department ever said anything that could remotely sound like their intent is to achieve goals related to racial representation. And should a school district want to adopt an admissions policy similar to Fairfax’s, it would be well-advised to make sure that members of its board or administration had never made comments about the need to engage in anything resembling racial balancing.

Joshua Dunn is executive director of the University of Tennessee, Knoxville’s  Institute of American Civics at the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy.

The post High Court Decision in College Admissions Case Has K-12 Implications appeared first on Education Next.

]]>
49716732
The Imperial Presidency Meets Student Debt https://www.educationnext.org/the-imperial-presidency-meets-student-debt-supreme-court-skeptical-biden-unilateral-loan-forgiveness/ Wed, 01 Mar 2023 13:25:49 +0000 https://www.educationnext.org/?p=49716388 Supreme Court skeptical of Biden’s unilateral loan forgiveness

The post The Imperial Presidency Meets Student Debt appeared first on Education Next.

]]>
Nebraska Solicitor General Jim Campbell speaks with reporters outside the Supreme Court on Capitol Hill in Washington, Tuesday, Feb. 28, 2023, after arguing before the court against President Joe Biden's student debt relief plan. Standing behind Campbell are Missouri Attorney General Andrew Bailey, from left, Iowa Attorney General Brenna Bird, Ray Wagner of the Missouri Attorney General's office and Nebraska Attorney General Mike Hilgers.
Nebraska Solicitor General Jim Campbell speaks with reporters outside the Supreme Court on Capitol Hill in Washington, Tuesday, Feb. 28, 2023, after arguing before the court against President Joe Biden’s student debt relief plan. Standing behind Campbell are Missouri Attorney General Andrew Bailey, from left, Iowa Attorney General Brenna Bird, Ray Wagner of the Missouri Attorney General’s office and Nebraska Attorney General Mike Hilgers.

The 20th century witnessed an astonishing growth in presidential power, leading some to contend that the office had become “imperial,” dominating other branches of government. President Biden’s decision in 2022 to forgive more than $350 billion in student loan debt—an action taken on the basis of statutory authority that was, at best, unclear—gave critics of the imperial presidency another reason to worry.

During the 2020 presidential campaign, Biden promised to waive up to $10,000 in federal student-loan debt. When he did so in August of 2022, the amount increased to $20,000 for Pell Grant recipients but was limited to $10,000 for all others. To qualify, in either 2020 or 2021 the adjusted gross income for individuals had to be less than $125,000 and for married couples less than $250,000. The legal authority on which Biden relied to justify the action was the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2003, also known as the HEROES Act. The Act, which was passed in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, allows the Secretary of Education to “waive or modify any statutory or regulatory provision . . . as may be necessary to ensure that” borrowers affected by a national emergency “are not placed in a worse position financially.” It defined the individuals who could qualify for relief as those serving on active duty or in the national guard during a war or other military operation, those living or working or is employed in an area that is declared a disaster area by a federal, state or local government, or those who have “suffered direct economic hardship as a direct result of a war or other military operation or national emergency.”

Previously, in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the Trump administration had suspended student loan repayments, a policy Biden continued while unsuccessfully seeking Congressional passage of loan forgiveness. Indeed, prior to Biden’s action, it was difficult to find many people who thought the president had the authority to cancel debt unilaterally without a new act of Congress. For instance, in July of 2021, when asked about student loan forgiveness, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi said, “The president can’t do it. So that’s not even a discussion. Not everybody realizes that. But the president can only postpone, delay, but not forgive.” The “discussion” that nonetheless ensued ultimately led to oral argument before the Supreme Court February 28, 2023, in two cases, Biden v. Nebraska and Department of Education v. Brown, that challenged the Biden administration’s decision.

The first was brought by six Republican state attorneys general. They contended that Biden had exceeded his authority under the HEROES Act and that the plan was created in violation of rulemaking procedures that federal agencies are supposed to follow. A federal district court judge, Henry Autrey, initially dismissed the case, saying that states lacked standing to sue. But a three-judge appellate panel in the 8th Circuit overturned that decision and granted an emergency injunction pausing the program. The Supreme Court then accepted a Biden Administration request to hear the case on expedited schedule.

The second case was brought by two student-loan borrowers. Myra Brown did not qualify for relief under the program because her loans were held by commercial lenders. Alexander Taylor did not qualify for $20,000 of relief because he did not receive Pell Grants. Both argued that it was “irrational, arbitrary, and unfair” for their debt to not be forgiven too. A district court judge, Mark Pittman, ruled that the program was unlawful. When the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals refused to pause that ruling, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case on an expedited schedule as well.

At oral argument, the justices spent significant time discussing whether the states or the students had standing. The best hope for the Biden Administration to prevail would be for some of the court’s conservatives to join with the liberal bloc to declare that none of the plaintiffs had a right to sue. For plaintiffs to have standing, they must show a “concrete harm” or “injury in fact.” Some of the conservative justices, such as Justice Barrett, appeared sympathetic to the claims that some of the plaintiffs could not meet that standard. But overall, the justices seemed skeptical about accepting the consequences of adopting that position. Chief Justice Roberts captured that skepticism when he said to Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar, who was defending the policy for the Biden Administration, that her view means “that the President can act unilaterally” and therefore “there was no role for Congress to play in this either, and at least in this case, given your view of standing, there’s no role for us to play in this — in this either.” This outcome seemed antithetical to principles of separation of powers and the ability of each branch of government to check abuses of power by the others to Roberts. As well, Prelogar acknowledged under questioning by Justice Alito that as long as the court finds that any party in either of the cases has standing that the court could decide both cases on the merits. Since standing doctrine is relatively flexible, it seems likely that the court will decide that at least one of the two students or one of the six states does in fact have standing.

If the court’s conservatives do reach the merits, enough of the justices appeared unconvinced that Biden had sufficient legal authority for his action to make betting on the program’s survival unwise. Most importantly, there seemed to be a consensus that at the least the policy should fall under the major questions doctrine. Just last term, the court used that doctrine to strike down the Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan in West Virginia v. EPA. The doctrine says that if an agency wants to decide an issue of extraordinary economic or political significance, the agency must be able to point to Congressional authorization that is clear and specific rather than merely vague. Even Justice Sotomayor said that the significant sum involved in forgiving the loans “seems to favor the argument that this is a major question.” Prelogar tried to argue that the doctrine should only apply to exercises of regulatory authority by an agency while this was merely a “benefits program” which allegedly has a lower threshold of “liberty interests” for citizens. That distinction did not seem to gain any traction.

Justice Thomas pointed to another concern. Canceling the debt was “in effect . . . a grant of $400 billion,” he noted, which seemed to him to run “head long into Congress’s appropriations authority.” Other justices seemed skeptical that even if the program could be created that it could be done so outside of normal notice-and-comment rulemaking where the public has an opportunity to weigh in on the effects of the decision. Prelogar argued that Congress had exempted the HEROES Act from those requirements, but Justice Kavanaugh seemed to think that outside of ordinary rulemaking it would be impossible for the Secretary of Education to factor in all the “big winners and big losers” created by loan forgiveness.

Those “winners and losers” also troubled Chief Justice Roberts, who raised questions about the fairness of the program. Some people might have worked hard during college to avoid taking out loans while others did not, but only the latter would rewarded. Roberts also mentioned a hypothetical landscape-business owner who didn’t go to college but who borrowed money to start a business. His debt was not forgiven, and his tax dollars were spent to subsidize the college graduates. At one point, the chief referred to the loan forgiveness as a “half trillion” dollar action. To Roberts this reinforced that this kind of decision should be left to Congress, since “we like to usually leave situations of that sort, when you’re talking about spending the government’s money, which is the taxpayers’ money, to the people in charge of the money, which is Congress.”

Overall, the broad concerns about executive power likely point to a loss for the Biden Administration. Justice Kavanaugh, for instance, said that “some of the biggest mistakes in the Court’s history were deferring to assertions of executive emergency power” while “some of the finest moments in the Court’s history were pushing back against presidential assertions of emergency power.” One could even imagine a majority agreeing that the policy was unlawful but not agreeing on the reasons why, which would still mean a defeat for the Biden Administration.

The administration tried to turn the focus back to the beneficiaries of the debt relief, with Secretary of Education Cardona issuing a post-argument statement about “the crushing burden of student debt for millions of working families.” The court may tell those families, essentially, that if they want loan forgiveness, they will need not only to elect a sympathetic president such as Biden, but also to install a Congress that is willing to authorize the expenditure in a more explicit way than was done by the HEROES Act of 2003. Those concerned about the imperial presidency would welcome that result.

Joshua Dunn is professor of political science and director of the Center for the Study of Government and the Individual at the University of Colorado Colorado Springs.

This article appeared in the Summer 2023 issue of Education Next. Suggested citation format:

Dunn, J. (2023). The Imperial Presidency Meets Student Debt: Supreme Court skeptical of Biden’s unilateral loan forgiveness. Education Next, 23(3), 6-7.

The post The Imperial Presidency Meets Student Debt appeared first on Education Next.

]]>
49716388
Supreme Court Skeptical in Affirmative Action Cases https://www.educationnext.org/supreme-court-skeptical-in-affirmative-action-cases/ Mon, 31 Oct 2022 23:22:19 +0000 https://www.educationnext.org/?p=49715972 No Civil War over oboe players, Chief Roberts reminds Harvard’s lawyer

The post Supreme Court Skeptical in Affirmative Action Cases appeared first on Education Next.

]]>
Man with a sign saying “Fix K–12 do not scapegoat Asians” at a rally against affirmative action and racial discrimination against Asian American students in college admissions. The rally was held one day before arguments are being heard at the Supreme Court about a related case.

In the war over affirmative action, the counsel for Harvard, Seth Waxman, might have made a fatal admission in his oral argument in Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) v. Harvard. Under questioning from Chief Justice Roberts trying to verify that race was a determinative factor in some admission cases, Waxman agreed that it was but then went on to say that it was similar to a university admitting an oboe player because the school needed someone with an oboe player’s skills. Roberts immediately responded that America had not fought a war over oboe players but it had fought one over race, which is why the Court has always subjected racial classifications to strict scrutiny. This admission also pointed to the fact that in a zero-sum game such as college admissions, if one person gets a benefit because of race and another person does not, then there must be some form of racial discrimination occurring. That, it looks like, could be the decisive factor in the court’s decision.

Beyond this crucial concession, there seemed to be several other reasons, based on the oral argument in the Harvard case and the companion case, University of North Carolina v. SFFA, to think that affirmative action might be declared unconstitutional or will soon be declared unconstitutional. Most importantly, no one defending either Harvard or UNC at the October 31 oral argument—which included Waxman, U.S. Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar, North Carolina Solicitor General Ryan Park, and David Hinojosa of the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights—could offer anything resembling a firm deadline for the end of affirmative action. Pointing to Justice O’Connor’s position in her majority opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) that “We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today,” none would even hazard anything resembling an “end point.” Instead, the position offered was that yes it will end when, as Prelogar said, schools have reached their “diversity goals.” But they did not say what those goals should be nor when they could conceivably be met. At least two of the conservative justices, including Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Barrett, sounded like they might have been more sympathetic to letting Harvard and UNC continue their affirmative action programs if they could have given a more concrete deadline. At least they might have been willing to let it continue until we meet O’Connor’s 25-year deadline in 2028 or maybe somewhat longer if they had been provided a precise end date. The failure to do so seems like a tactical error. Even if UNC and Harvard would want it to continue in perpetuity, making that rhetorical concession could allow them to live to fight another day.

Another option for Harvard and UNC to peel off a couple members of the conservative bloc would have been to convince them that under originalist grounds the 14th Amendment allows for race-conscious policies such as affirmative action. The two attorneys for SFFA, Cameron Norris who argued against Harvard and Patrick Strawbridge who argued against UNC, both contended that the race conscious policies that had been adopted in the wake of the Civil War and after the passage of the 14th Amendment were remedial and that under Justice Powell’s controlling opinion in Bakke v. California that was not a compelling justification for the use of race in college admissions. The universities had not really tried to defend the affirmative action programs under consideration on the grounds that they were remedial. Instead, as Bakke required, the compelling government purpose had to be diversity. Again, none of the advocates defending Harvard and UNC seemed to offer a persuasive response to this claim, or at least one persuasive enough to satisfy committed originalists such as Gorsuch and Thomas. A lawyer representing UNC’s position did mention Confederate relics and even white supremacist marches on his campus and said that universities in states that had not had legal segregation might have weaker or even non-existent claims to race-conscious admissions, but he was grilled on whether such admissions benefits would apply to an applicant with a single African-American great-grandparent.

As well, other conservative justices expressed significant concern that “holistic” admissions programs were, as Justice Gorsuch called them, “subterfuge” for unconstitutional racial quotas. Harvard, he pointed out, had adopted a holistic approach in the 1920s in order to limit the number of Jews in its student body. Justice Kavanaugh even asked whether Harvard had sold Justice Powell “a bill of goods” when it offered and he accepted its holistic method in Bakke. Waxman contended that whatever noxious motivations Harvard had in the past, that the two situations were completely different. That, again, was unlikely to affect the conservative bloc. Perhaps recognizing that they were making little headway with the court’s conservatives, both Waxman and Prelogar floated the idea that if the court disagreed with the lower courts’ interpretation of the findings of fact that they should remand the cases to be reheard based on clarifying guidance provided by the court.

Finally, and solely related to Harvard, Waxman struggled to respond to questions about the personal ratings that Asian-American applicants consistently receive by Harvard’s admissions department. Each applicant to Harvard is given a personal rating encompassing qualities such as “leadership,” “courage,” “likeability,” “self-confidence,” and “kindness.” Asian-Americans consistently receive worse scores than other ethnic groups based on this personal rating. For instance, 22.2 percent of Asian-Americans applicants in Harvard’s top academic decile receive a personal rating of 1 or 2, compared to 29.6 percent for Whites, 34.21 percent for Hispanics, and 46.97 percent for African Americans. To defend this, Waxman fell back on the ruling by the trial court that this does not in fact count as evidence of racial discrimination. He called it only a slight statistical disparity in an initial “triage,” perhaps related to confidential letters of recommendation. One suspects, though, that if the races were reversed he would not regard this as an innocuous abnormality. While appellate courts generally accede to the findings of fact by trial courts, here one suspects the conservatives will be unpersuaded. Justice Alito, for instance, pressed Waxman to choose whether the systematically lower scores were evidence that Harvard believes Asian-American applicants lack those characteristics or, alternatively, that there is something wrong with Harvard’s personal score.

With the usual caveat that predicting outcomes based on oral argument is hazardous and uncertain, in light of today’s, it would seem prudent for schools to prepare for an environment where they cannot consider race in admissions. In the case of private institutions such as Harvard and public universities that receive federal funds, which is all of them, the justices appear poised to rule that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act clearly forbids racial discrimination and that the use of race necessarily requires racial discrimination. Prelogar tried to argue that the use of the word “discrimination” in Title VI was ambiguous, prompting Justice Gorsuch to ask if the court was mistaken in Bostock v. Clayton County, an opinion he authored forbidding discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, which held that the meaning of discrimination in Title VII of the same act was not ambiguous. Her response was that the court was not mistaken but that the same term was in fact ambiguous in one but not the other. Additionally, the court seems likely to rule that the use of race in admissions violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment which public universities are also bound by. Going forward, there might be additional questions that universities will have to confront such as the legality and constitutionality of other mechanisms they use to promote racial diversity, including such things as diversity statements from job applicants. One simply does not get the sense that a majority on this current court is sympathetic to those aims.

Joshua Dunn is professor of political science and director of the Center for the Study of Government and the Individual at the University of Colorado Colorado Springs.

This article appeared in the Spring 2023 issue of Education Next. Suggested citation format:

Dunn, J. (2023). Supreme Court Skeptical in Affirmative Action Cases: No Civil War over oboe players, Chief Roberts reminds Harvard’s lawyer. Education Next, 23(2), 6-7.

The post Supreme Court Skeptical in Affirmative Action Cases appeared first on Education Next.

]]>
49715972
In West Virginia, Scholarship Program Faces a Legal Challenge https://www.educationnext.org/west-virginia-scholarship-program-faces-a-legal-challenge/ Mon, 25 Jul 2022 09:01:55 +0000 https://www.educationnext.org/?p=49715605 Defeated in legislatures, school-choice opponents look to courts

The post In West Virginia, Scholarship Program Faces a Legal Challenge appeared first on Education Next.

]]>
West Virginia circut court judge Joanna Tabit
A state circuit court judge, Joanna Tabit, issued an injunction halting West Virginia’s Hope Scholarship Program.

Opponents of school choice, after a string of recent defeats in state legislatures (see “School Choice Advances in the States,” features, Fall 2021) are turning to litigation, asking courts to block these new options for parents and students.

One of their first targets is West Virginia’s Hope Scholarship Program. Passed in 2021, this program would have allowed qualified students, which included 93 percent of West Virginia students, to use the average amount of per-pupil state funding, approximately $4,300, on qualifying education expenses, including private school tuition.

The ink was barely dry on the governor’s signature before Mountain State Justice, a state progressive public interest law firm, announced in September 2021 that it would sue. They followed through in January 2022 with a case in Kanawha County Circuit Court, Beaver v. Moore, alleging a host of state constitutional violations.

Their first claim was based on the state constitution’s education clause, which says that “The Legislature shall provide, by general law, for a thorough and efficient system of free schools.” Interestingly the complaint claimed that that clause says that the state can “only provide for a system of free public schools” (emphasis in original). The clause does not actually say “only ,” nor does it indicate that whatever “thorough and efficient” means it only applies to public schools. The clause does not, in fact, limit the state’s ability to support education in other ways.

They also claimed that the program “violates the Legislature’s first constitutional obligation to fund public schools” because it “would negatively impact funding for public schools” since students might leave and therefore districts would not receive their per-pupil funding from the state. However, once again, there is nothing in West Virginia’s Constitution actually saying that programs negatively impacting school funding would be unconstitutional. That claim is so broad that it could include anything that could “incentivize” actions that would reduce enrollment. One could, after all, claim that insufficient road maintenance was prompting people to leave the state which could reduce enrollment in public schools or that inadequate public safety made the state less attractive to parents which would then reduce spending on schools.

Mountain State also alleged that the program violated the state constitution’s requirement that the “school fund” can be used for “no purpose whatsoever” than funding public schools. But the program does not take funds from the school fund. The act created a different fund that is paid for out of the state’s general fund. Other claims, such as that the program “usurps” the state Board of Education’s constitutional authority, were just as dubious. The board’s authority only extends to public schools, not all schools, as the argument seemed to imply.

In March, Mountain State asked for a temporary injunction halting the program. On July 6, a state circuit court judge, Joanna Tabit, went even farther than that request and issued a permanent injunction, meaning that it is her final judgment and that it will not be reconsidered unless she is overturned by a higher court. She has yet to issue a written opinion but from the bench she claimed that it violated the “thorough and efficient” education clause and said, “In my view, the plaintiffs and the public school system will suffer irreparable harm if the scholarship program and the legislation establishing it are not enjoined from being implemented.” The state allocations for this coming year, however, were based on last year’s enrollments, so the public schools would be receiving the same amount of money regardless of whether students received Hope Scholarships. Only next year would school districts’ state distributions potentially decline if parents sought options outside of the public school system and the program were not struck down by the courts.

While Tabit seemed very concerned about protecting public schools from competition, she was remarkably unconcerned about what would happen to the more than 3,000 students who had been told that they would receive scholarships for the coming year. After the ruling, the state immediately announced that “students and educational service providers may not be able to access Hope Scholarship funds for the 2022-2023 school year, even if a student’s application for the Hope Scholarship Program has already been approved.”

For now these students can only hope that the state’s petition for a stay to a court of appeals will be approved. In addition to documenting the contorted reasoning of the plaintiffs, the appeal, filed on July 19, pointed to the harmful timing of the injunction, which left “thousands” of families in “limbo.” The state also expressed frustration with Tabit refusing to say when she “will ultimately issue its written orders, even though the program was set to start depositing funds for families next month.”

Whatever the ultimate outcome in West Virginia, other states that have created or expanded school choice programs should expect similar challenges based on state constitution education clauses which often include a requirement for “thorough and efficient” or “thorough and uniform” or “general and uniform” public school systems. A voucher program in Florida faced a similar challenge (see “Florida Grows a Lemon,” Summer 2006). Such approaches may become more common now that the U.S. Supreme Court has issued rulings making state Blaine amendments, which restrict funding to religious institutions, less useful for choice opponents to rely on. Historically, as adequacy lawsuits demanding greater funding show, state court judges have not been shy about finding all sorts of previously unknown content in these state education clauses. In short, dodgy constitutional arguments have not been a barrier to judicial meddling in the past, so one should not count on them being a deterrent moving forward. However, state courts do operate under greater political constraints than federal courts (most state judges are either initially elected or subject to retention elections if initially appointed), so getting the programs off the ground and creating a constituency supporting them could eventually help serve to protect them from judges otherwise inclined to impose their policy preferences under the guise of constitutional interpretation.

Joshua Dunn is professor of political science and director of the Center for the Study of Government and the Individual at the University of Colorado Colorado Springs.

The post In West Virginia, Scholarship Program Faces a Legal Challenge appeared first on Education Next.

]]>
49715605
The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause Doesn’t Suspend Free Speech and Free Exercise Rights, Supreme Court Rules https://www.educationnext.org/the-first-amendments-establishment-clause-doesnt-suspend-free-speech-and-free-exercise-rights-supreme-court-rules/ Mon, 27 Jun 2022 20:43:11 +0000 https://www.educationnext.org/?p=49715508 Opinion backs prayer by football coach, scraps Lemon test

The post The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause Doesn’t Suspend Free Speech and Free Exercise Rights, Supreme Court Rules appeared first on Education Next.

]]>
Former Bremerton High School assistant football coach Joe Kennedy takes a knee in front of the U.S. Supreme Court after his legal case, Kennedy vs. Bremerton School District, was argued before the court on April 25, 2022 in Washington, DC.
Former Bremerton High School assistant football coach Joe Kennedy takes a knee in front of the U.S. Supreme Court after his legal case, Kennedy vs. Bremerton School District, was argued before the court on April 25, 2022 in Washington, DC. Kennedy was terminated from his job by Bremerton public school officials in 2015 after refusing to stop his on-field prayers after football games.

Today’s decision in Kennedy v. Bremerton reinforces a significant shift in the Supreme Court’s posture towards religion and education. Following the pattern established in Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, Espinoza v. Montana, and last week’s Carson v. Makin, the court is placing far greater emphasis on the Free Exercise Clause and, in the process, substantially modifying its interpretation of the Establishment Clause. In this case, the court also buttressed the speech rights of public-school employees in ways that will likely extend far beyond the issue of religion.

Joseph Kennedy, an assistant football coach, had been fired by the Bremerton, Washington school district when he refused to stop praying after games. For seven years, Kennedy had prayed post-game at the middle of the field without incident. While he had originally done this by himself, some of the Bremerton players eventually asked to join him. Those players then invited players from opposing teams to join them. This led a coach from an opposing team to alert Kennedy’s school that the coach was violating the Constitution. School administrators then instructed Kennedy that, if he wanted to continue praying, he could only do so in a private space away from the players. He refused and told the school that he would continue to pray at midfield and that, if students wanted to join him, he would not forbid them. The school then fired him. Kennedy challenged his firing as a violation of his free speech and free exercise rights under the First Amendment, leading to today’s ruling.

Most importantly, the majority opinion by Justice Gorsuch, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Barrett, and Kavanaugh (who joined all but one section of the opinion), officially ruled that the three-pronged Lemon Test should not guide judicial analysis of alleged Establishment Clause violations. This aptly named test arose from 1971’s Lemon v. Kurtzman and held that government policy 1) must have a secular legislative purpose, 2) must not primarily advance or inhibit religion, and 3) must not create an excessive entanglement with religion. The test proved hopelessly unworkable and contradictory in practice. Most obviously, whatever steps government officials could take to ensure that a policy did not advance religion risked creating excessive entanglement. Over time, this flaw led a majority of justices to call for its burial—but never, until Kennedy v. Bremerton, at the same time.

In 2019, the court ruled in American Legion v. American Humanist Association that the test would no longer apply to evaluation of public monuments, but its status in other areas, including in education where it was applied most often, remained unclear (see “Supreme Court Partially Junks a Lemon,” Legal Beat, Winter 2020). Today’s opinion officially laid it to rest. Gorsuch wrote that judicial inquiry into potential Establishment Clause violations should instead be based on “‘reference to historical practices and understandings’ and must be consistent with ‘the understanding of the Founding Fathers.’” This would indicate that the court might take a more relaxed approach towards some forms of prayer in school or school related activities such as graduation ceremonies since those certainly were not considered Establishment Clause violations for most of American history.

The court also eliminated the Endorsement Test—sometimes considered an offshoot of Lemon and sometimes considered a replacement for the second prong—which held that government should not do anything that might signal to religious dissenters that they are outsiders. That test also proved unworkable because no one knows exactly when government might cross that line. That uncertainty led it to be ridiculed as the “Two Rudolphs and a Frosty Rule” or the “Plastic Reindeer Rule.” Public schools had to be certain that any Christmas display also included symbols from other either secular or religious celebrations of the winter solstice.

The court ruled not only that the Lemon Test must go but also that the Establishment Clause could not be used as a justification to violate free speech and free exercise rights. “Both the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment,” Gorsuch wrote, “protect expressions like Mr. Kennedy’s. Nor does a proper understanding of the Amendment’s Establishment Clause require the government to single out private religious speech for special disfavor. The Constitution and the best of our traditions counsel mutual respect and tolerance, not censorship and suppression, for religious and nonreligious views alike.” The court said that ruling against Kennedy would have also authorized firing a Muslim teacher for wearing a headscarf or a Christian teacher for praying over “her lunch in the cafeteria.”

The decision is likely to expand the free speech rights of public-school teachers and other government employees because the court ruled that Kennedy’s speech was private and on a matter of public concern. Under the standard established in 2005’s Garcetti v. Ceballos, speech by government employees is not protected if it is made “pursuant” to their “official duties.” Since the court rejected Bremerton’s claim that Kennedy’s speech was part of his official duties, other school districts will have to exercise caution in claiming that speech on matters of public concern—a much broader category than religious speech—is part of an employee’s official duties and thus punishable, particularly when the speech occurs outside of the classroom. The majority clearly feared that the government could use “‘excessively broad job descriptions’” to undermine the rights of government employees.

The court’s liberal bloc of Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan dissented. Writing for the three, Sotomayor contended that Kennedy was acting in his official capacity and that “school officials leading prayers” is “constitutionally impermissible.” Most importantly, though, she argued that the court should not have overruled Lemon and its three-pronged test in favor of a “‘history and tradition’ test.” Public schools, she argued, offer unique challenges that might require limiting speech under the Establishment Clause that would otherwise be protected.

Moving forward, schools will certainly have far more flexibility in accommodating religious speech. In fact, considering the court’s focus on the original understanding of and practices under the Establishment Clause, schools will be required to accommodate more religious speech. The majority did maintain that the government cannot coerce citizens to engage in religious practices. One suspects that future legal controversies will hinge on how the court defines coercion. If the court’s analysis will truly focus on history and tradition then that definition will likely be quite limited. Previously, the court has said that psychological coercion or essentially peer pressure could count as coercion under the Establishment Clause. One suspects that today’s majority would have doubts that that would count as coercion and would lean toward the late Justice Scalia’s definition, which was that coercion only occurs when the government punishes you for refusing to support a particular religion.

Joshua Dunn is professor of political science and director of the Center for the Study of Government and the Individual at the University of Colorado Colorado Springs.

This article appeared in the Fall 2022 issue of Education Next. Suggested citation format:

Dunn, J. (2022). The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause Doesn’t Suspend Free Speech and Free Exercise Rights, Supreme Court Rules: Opinion backs prayer by football coach, scraps Lemon Test. Education Next, 22(4), 6-7.

The post The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause Doesn’t Suspend Free Speech and Free Exercise Rights, Supreme Court Rules appeared first on Education Next.

]]>
49715508
In Carson v. Makin, Justices Prolong Death of Blaine Amendments, but Don’t Quite Finish the Job https://www.educationnext.org/carson-v-makin-supreme-court-decision-prolongs-death-of-blaine-amendments/ Tue, 21 Jun 2022 18:09:43 +0000 https://www.educationnext.org/?p=49715488 Supreme Court majority rules that Maine can’t exclude religious schools from tuitioning program

The post In <em>Carson v. Makin</em>, Justices Prolong Death of Blaine Amendments, but Don’t Quite Finish the Job appeared first on Education Next.

]]>
Dave and Amy Carson with their daughter at Bangor Christian Schools in Maine. The Carsons are one of three families that sued Maine over a program that bans families from an otherwise generally available student-aid program if they choose to send their children to schools that teach religion. (Photo by the Institute for Justice www.ij.org.)
Dave and Amy Carson with their daughter at Bangor Christian Schools in Maine. The Carsons are one of three families that sued Maine over a program that bans families from an otherwise generally available student-aid program if they choose to send their children to schools that teach religion.

The Blaine Amendments’ long, painful death continues. Carson v. Makin provided an opportunity for the court to inter them fully but it declined to so. Instead, the Court’s reasoning announced today essentially means that the infamous amendments, which forbid states from using public funds to support religious institutions, almost always violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment—but given what the court declined to say, Blaine could potentially survive in extremely limited circumstances.

The Supreme Court initially began its slow-motion execution of Blaine Amendments in 2017’s Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, which held that Missouri’s rejection of a religious school’s grant application to resurface a playground because of the state’s Blaine Amendment was unconstitutional. However, the 7-2 majority said that it was so because of discrimination solely based on the religious status of the school. Potentially, discrimination based on religious use could be possible. Then, in 2019’s Espinoza v. Montana, the court ruled that excluding religious schools from a tax credit scholarship program also constituted unconstitutional discrimination based on religious status.  Singling out citizens and institutions from a general program solely because they happen to be religious violated longstanding principles that religious believers cannot be excluded from receiving otherwise available benefits. After this, the status versus use distinction was clearly on life-support. Today the court reduced the flow of oxygen without completely cutting it off.

The issue in Carson v. Makin was a 1982 Maine law that excluded religious schools from the state “tuitioning system,” which pays for students to attend private schools (Maine does not have a Blaine Amendment). Maine’s rural character means that a majority of its school districts do not have secondary schools. To ensures that all students can attend high school, the state has paid for students to attend either another public school or a private school of their choice—which included religious schools until that 1982 law was enacted. Citing Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza, a First Circuit panel, which included retired Supreme Court Justice David Souter, upheld Maine’s law, saying that it discriminated based on religious use and not status because religious schools could participate as long as they offered a non-sectarian education. This reasoning simply illustrated that the distinction between status and use was inherently unstable, since it really meant that religious schools could avoid being discriminated against as long they were not religious.

In a 6-3 decision for the court, Chief Justice Roberts—joined by Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, Gorsuch, and Barrett—did not eliminate the status versus use distinction but severely eroded it. Roberts concluded that simply labeling a restriction on funding to religious schools “use”-based did not offer it constitutional immunity. Instead, use-based restrictions also constitute religious discrimination and therefore must satisfy strict scrutiny: they must serve a compelling government interest and be narrowly tailored. This program did not meet that standard. He concluded that “there is nothing neutral about Maine’s program. The State pays tuition for certain students at private schools— so long as the schools are not religious. That is discrimination against religion. A State’s antiestablishment interest does not justify enactments that exclude some members of the community from an otherwise generally available public benefit because of their religious exercise.”

Importantly, however, Roberts did not eliminate the status-use distinction, leaving open the possibility that some forms of use-based discrimination could survive. For instance, he pointed out that the court had previously upheld a use-based restriction in Locke v. Davey (2004) as a very narrow exception based on the state’s interest in not subsidizing the training of clergy. But Locke, he said, “cannot be read beyond its narrow focus on vocational religious degrees to generally authorize the State to exclude religious persons from the enjoyment of public benefits on the basis of their anticipated religious use of the benefits.”

Roberts also made certain to emphasize, as he did in Espinoza, that a state does not have to subsidize private education—but that once it does it must do so on a religiously neutral basis. That assurance, however, did not satisfy the dissenters, particularly Justice Breyer, who was joined by Kagan and Sotomayor. Continuing the same arguments Breyer made in his dissent in Espinoza, he argued that there is really no way to limit the majority’s reasoning saying, “We have never previously held what the Court holds today, namely, that a State must (not may) use state funds to pay for religious education as part of a tuition program designed to ensure the provision of free statewide public school education.” He then asked if school districts must now provide “equivalent funds to parents who wish to send their children to religious schools?” and whether “school districts that give vouchers for use at charter schools must pay equivalent funds to parents who wish to give their children a religious education?”

Justice Sotomayor also offered her own dissent that was not joined by Breyer or Kagan. She simply bemoaned the fact that the court even “started down the path” it did in Trinity Lutheran and was continuing, in her view, “to dismantle the wall of separation between church and state that the Framers fought to build.”

What does this decision mean going forward? In particular, this ruling will make it more difficult to refuse to allow religious organizations to run charter schools, even ones that want to provide explicitly religious instruction. That would seem to deny a generally available benefit on the basis of religion that could not survive today’s more limited understanding of constitutional use-based restrictions. Certainly, states and school districts that offer support for private schools will be hard-pressed to deny support to religious schools unless they happen to be the odd k-12 school that exists to train ministers. However, one could expect those that do deny that funding to come up with more elaborate use-based justifications. One should also expect litigation based on Breyer’s questions. Cabining the majority’s reasoning would seem to be difficult. But that also forces one to ask if Chief Justice Roberts, in his minimalist mode, is not confirming Zeno’s Paradox. Each decision, starting with Trinity Lutheran and continuing through today’s, takes a step towards eliminating Blaine Amendments, but the court never seems to get all the way there.

Joshua Dunn is professor of political science and director of the Center for the Study of Government and the Individual at the University of Colorado Colorado Springs.

This article appeared in the Winter 2023 issue of Education Next. Suggested citation format:

Dunn, J. (2023). In Carson v. Makin, Supreme Court Prolongs Death of Blaine Amendments: Majority rules that Maine can’t exclude religious schools from tuitioning program. Education Next, 23(1), 6-7.

The post In <em>Carson v. Makin</em>, Justices Prolong Death of Blaine Amendments, but Don’t Quite Finish the Job appeared first on Education Next.

]]>
49715488
Minneapolis Tries to Protect Minority Teachers from Layoffs https://www.educationnext.org/minneapolis-tries-to-protect-minority-teachers-from-layoffs/ Wed, 15 Jun 2022 15:32:28 +0000 https://www.educationnext.org/?p=49715466 New contract was worded with care, but faces legal peril as unduly race-based

The post Minneapolis Tries to Protect Minority Teachers from Layoffs appeared first on Education Next.

]]>
Striking Minneapolis teachers rallied in March 2022 at the state capitol.
Striking Minneapolis teachers rallied in March 2022 at the state capitol. Their new contract contains a provision protecting minority educators from layoffs.

Education reformers have long argued that “last in, first out” policies on teacher layoffs are educationally harmful. When teachers are retained based solely on seniority and not effectiveness, students suffer. It’s hard to think of a retention policy that is more counter-productive, but the Minneapolis Public Schools just might have. The school district and teachers union have managed to create a policy that not only disregards teacher quality but also is likely illegal.

In March, Minneapolis teachers went on strike for three weeks demanding higher pay. Their new contract, which will go into effect in 2023, also modified the district’s last in, first out policy so that layoffs due to enrollment declines will be based on seniority unless a teacher is “a member of a population underrepresented among licensed teachers in the district.” Because minority teachers in the district tend to be younger, they have been more likely to be let go. The district and union assiduously avoided referencing race to help inoculate the policy from litigation. For instance, a male teacher might be able to claim protection because male teachers are also underrepresented compared to the district’s student population. However, that would certainly be subject to a challenge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbids discrimination based on sex. It is nonetheless clear that race was the primary motivating factor for the change in policy and would be the most common reason for its application.

Defenders of the policy cite research showing that having a minority teacher can improve educational outcomes for minority students. But even if one could show that the policy would have uniformly positive educational outcomes, it is still very likely illegal, at least when applied based on race. After all, the Supreme Court ruled in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle (2006) that race was not a compelling government interest in student assignment for K-12 education. Even Justice Kennedy’s notoriously opaque concurring opinion, which held that school districts could use a variety of strategies to avoid racial isolation, emphasized that districts could not treat students in a “different fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race.” Minneapolis’s policy would require that kind of systematic typing. It’s not clear how such an approach could be legal when applied to teachers if it was illegal when applied to students.

Even more troubling for the district is that the Supreme Court addressed a similar policy in the 1986 case Wygant v. Jackson. In response to racial tension in the community the Jackson School District from Michigan modified its collective bargaining agreement so that “In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers through layoff from employment by the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the district shall be retained, except that at no time will there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff.” The district’s  goal was to remedy past discrimination and to provide minority role models. While a majority could not agree on the reasoning, five justices agreed that the policy violated the equal protection clause because “carried to its logical extreme, the idea that black students are better off with black teachers could lead to the very system the Court rejected in Brown v. Board of Education.

The policy in Wygant was actually less demanding than the one in Minneapolis, which appears to allow race always to be a trump card. In Wygant, race was only a trump card when the racial percentage of those being laid off exceeded the overall racial percentage of district employees. It is therefore hard to see how the Minneapolis policy could be sustained in a legal challenge. As well, the Supreme Court in Wygant was likely more sympathetic to consideration of race than today’s court. Thus, as much as the district has tried to protect itself from litigation, the policy will almost certainly invite it. One would be unwise to bet on the policy’s survival.

Joshua Dunn is professor of political science and director of the Center for the Study of Government and the Individual at the University of Colorado Colorado Springs.

The post Minneapolis Tries to Protect Minority Teachers from Layoffs appeared first on Education Next.

]]>
49715466
Coach’s Prayer Receives Jesuitical Analysis by Supreme Court https://www.educationnext.org/coachs-prayer-receives-jesuitical-analysis-by-supreme-court/ Mon, 25 Apr 2022 22:19:01 +0000 https://www.educationnext.org/?p=49715337 A “center of attention” test, coercion test, and endorsement test are discussed as standards for religious speech by school employees

The post Coach’s Prayer Receives Jesuitical Analysis by Supreme Court appeared first on Education Next.

]]>
In this Friday, October 16, 2015, photo, Bremerton assistant football coach Joe Kennedy, obscured at center in blue, is surrounded by Centralia players after they took a knee with him and prayed after their game against Bremerton, in Bremerton, Washington. The coach who was told by district officials to stop leading prayers after games went ahead with a prayer at the 50-yard line after a weekend game.

Today the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Kennedy v. Bremerton. While the argument itself was less than clarifying, the court’s eventual opinion in the case could go a long way in explaining how the Establishment, Free Exercise, and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment apply to public-school employees.

The case originated when the Bremerton, Washington School District removed Joseph Kennedy as football coach when he refused to stop praying after games. Kennedy, who was an assistant coach, had a practice of going to the middle of the field after games and briefly praying. Initially, he prayed alone, but eventually some Bremerton players asked if they could join him. Those players also invited players from opposing teams to join them. In 2015, a coach from an opposing team notified the school. The school told Kennedy that if he wanted to continue praying, he had to do so privately and away from students. He told the school that he would continue to pray at midfield and that if students wanted to join him, he would not forbid them. That led the school to fire him.

Kennedy challenged the decision as a violation of his free speech and free exercise rights under the First Amendment. The case had a Byzantine path to today’s oral argument. Initially, the trial court and Ninth Circuit upheld Kennedy’s punishment, leading him to appeal to the Supreme Court. The court denied Kennedy’s appeal for review in 2019, but in a separate statement Justice Alito argued that Kennedy might still have live claims once factual questions were resolved by lower courts. Alito’s statement, joined by Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, strongly implied the lower courts’ decisions justifying Kennedy’s firing because he had engaged in religious speech were wrong. Despite Alito’s statement, the Ninth Circuit reiterated that the district was justified in firing him and in fact had an obligation to do so under the Establishment Clause.

Today, several justices offered a blizzard of hypotheticals for Kennedy’s attorney, Paul Clement, who served as solicitor general of the U.S. during the administration of President George W. Bush. They also peppered Bremerton School District’s attorney, Richard Katskee, who is vice president and legal director of Americans United for Separation of Church and State, with questions making fine-grained distinctions that could best be called Jesuitical. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that Bremerton will have an outright victory. Instead, the school district has to hope that the Court will remand the case, sending it back down to the lower courts to be reconsidered based on a proper understanding of the Court’s doctrines.

The most basic issue is whether Kennedy’s speech was government speech or private speech. Bremerton argued that it was government speech and therefore could be controlled by the school district. There do not appear to be five votes for that position on the Court.

If Kennedy’s prayers were private speech, could the school district still punish him because of the Establishment Clause? The school district had, in fact, repeatedly claimed that allowing his prayers to continue would give the appearance that the school was endorsing his speech triggering the Establishment Clause. The problem for Bremerton is that the question of endorsement seemed to be closely tied to the Lemon Test, dating back to the 1971 case Lemon v. Kurtzman. Several of the conservative justices noted that the Lemon test had not been applied for decades in these kinds of cases and, in fact, as Justice Kavanaugh said, appeared to have been interred in American Legion v. American Humanist Association (See “Supreme Court Partially Junks a Lemon: American Legion Cross Case May Make It Harder to Sue Schools over Religion,” Legal Beat, Winter 2020). Justice Breyer, who joined the majority in American Legion, argued that even if Lemon were no longer good law, perhaps there were still strands of it that should still apply and, therefore, schools should be able consider the divisive effects of religion in regulating these kinds of circumstances. However, there seemed to be little appetite among the conservative justices to say that Kennedy’s speech could reasonably be interpreted as being endorsed by the school district. That makes it highly unlikely that there are five votes willing to decide the case on those grounds.

Pointing to a different line of cases such as Good News Club v. Milford (2001), Clement argued that simply because Kennedy’s prayer took place on public school property does not make it government speech. Nor does it imply that the government has endorsed the speech. The school had also made it clear that it was only punishing him because his speech was religious, and that runs afoul of basic free speech doctrines such as viewpoint and content neutrality.

The remaining Establishment Clause question is whether Kennedy’s prayers could be considered coercive. Katskee argued that coaches exercise significant authority over students. Not participating in the prayers could expose the students to the risk of being punished with loss of playing time. This line of questioning seemed to offer the best hope for Bremerton, but not because a majority of the Court agrees with it. Instead, Justice Gorsuch asked Katskee “If we thought the school district misunderstood the Establishment Clause teachings of this court, what should we do?” Katskee responded that it should remand it back to the Ninth Circuit to be evaluated under the coercion test.

Other justices questioned whether Kennedy’s prayers could be reasonably considered coercive since students were not compelled to participate or listen. Katskee argued that if the Court did not find that it was coercive it would have to overturn Engel v. Vitale (1962) which held that schools could not encourage students to recite an official nonsectarian prayer composed by state officials, Lee v. Weisman (1992) which held that schools cannot sponsor nonsectarian prayers at graduation ceremonies, and Santa Fe v. Doe (2000) which held that student-initiated-and-led prayers at football games were unconstitutional. That again seemed to be unpersuasive to the conservatives who thought that the facts of those cases involving captive audiences were sufficiently different that Kennedy’s prayers could be easily distinguished from them. Perhaps sensing that some justices might entertain the idea of remanding the case, in his rebuttal Clement contended that doing so would be improper. He said there was no indication of coercion when Kennedy was praying, noting that that the school district only focused on endorsement.

Several of the conservative justices expressed concern that ruling against Kennedy would then allow schools to punish employees for other kinds of religious speech. Justice Kavanaugh, for instance, asked if a coach who made the sign of the cross before a game could be fired if the school told him to stop. Katskee argued that Kennedy had “made himself the center of attention” which made the two examples different. Kavanaugh then asked what if the coach did it while all the fans and players were looking at him? Kavanaugh said that Katskee seemed to be asking the court to create a “center of attention” test, which would be even more unworkable. This would make someone’s constitutional rights contingent on how many people are paying attention to them. That’s not how rights usually work, notwithstanding the classic and abused “yelling fire in a crowded theater” free speech exception.

As well, other conservative justices seemed concerned that schools might discriminate against religious speech while allowing other kinds of speech. Justice Thomas asked whether taking a knee in support of Black Lives Matter would receive the same treatment. Justice Alito wondered whether a coach going to the middle of the field after a game to support Ukraine or to protest climate change would be punished.

Despite the apparent lack of consensus about how the case should be decided, a Bremerton victory seems remote. Again, their best hope would be for the case to be remanded, sent back to a lower court, but that might simply delay the inevitable moment when a skeptical majority of justices would fully consider the question of coercion.

Joshua Dunn is professor of political science and director of the Center for the Study of Government and the Individual at the University of Colorado Colorado Springs.

The post Coach’s Prayer Receives Jesuitical Analysis by Supreme Court appeared first on Education Next.

]]>
49715337
Suits Challenging Book “Banning” May Be Better Politics than Law https://www.educationnext.org/suits-challenging-book-banning-may-be-better-politics-than-law-maus/ Tue, 12 Apr 2022 09:00:43 +0000 https://www.educationnext.org/?p=49715233 School boards can’t suppress ideas they dislike but do have “broad discretion”

The post Suits Challenging Book “Banning” May Be Better Politics than Law appeared first on Education Next.

]]>
A man reads a copy of Maus by Art Spiegelman
The McGinn County Board of Education voted to remove Maus from its curriculum.

America is experiencing another spasm of conflict over book banning in public schools. In January 2022, the McGinn County Board of Education in Tennessee provoked a nationwide uproar when it unanimously voted to remove Maus, a graphic novel about the Holocaust, from its curriculum. The school board said that the book wasn’t appropriate because of certain language and a drawing of a nude woman. For the book and its author, Art Spiegelman, the flap generated the kind of publicity that money can’t buy.

This episode illustrates how the label “banning” is thrown around too easily. Even if one disagrees with the McGinn County Board’s reasons, removing a book from the curriculum is not the same as banning it. In 2020, a Massachusetts teacher boasted that she helped remove Homer’s Odyssey from her school’s curriculum. That, too, was not book banning but an attempt to make her school’s curriculum conform to her pedagogical agenda. Similarly, many school districts have removed Huckleberry Finn from the curriculum because of its liberal use of an offensive racial epithet. Again, that is not banning. School districts must have the authority to curate class readings. If not assigning a book constitutes banning it, then every time an English class syllabus changes, a book is being banned.

School districts have the authority to make these kinds of curricular choices. There are, however, instances where limiting students’ access to materials, particularly in libraries, violates the law. Such questions are already being litigated. Despite assertions of unconstitutional censorship, the scant case law that we have indicates that schools can remove material if they do so out of concerns about its appropriateness for school-age children and not to suppress ideas. That means that most alleged instances of book banning are likely lawful and that restraints on school districts are political rather than legal.

The central case addressing the issue is 1982’s Board of Education v. Pico. In 1975, the Island Trees Union Free School removed from the school library several books that it regarded as “anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Sem[i]tic, and just plain filthy.” It also decided that access to a few others should only be allowed with parental approval. In response, several students sued, claiming the board’s action violated their First Amendment rights. When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the justices were badly fractured. Four of them ruled that the action of the board violated the First Amendment because “the right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient’s meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom.” But four justices ruled that the board had not violated the First Amendment, and Justice Byron White argued that the case should be resolved without reaching the First Amendment question. White concurred with the four justices who ruled against the school district but wrote his own opinion arguing that, because there were still unresolved factual questions, it was premature to address the constitutional issue. This makes the precedential status of the decision ambiguous.

It is not clear that today’s court would treat such a splintered case as binding precedent. Even if it did, school officials have broader latitude under the Pico decision than one might think. The plurality opinion, written by Justice William Brennan Jr., held that “the First Amendment imposes limitations upon the exercise by a local school board of its discretion to remove library books from high school and junior high school libraries,” but also that “local school boards have broad discretion in the management of school affairs.” The opinion also made it clear that the ruling affects “only the discretion to remove books,” not a school board’s discretion “to choose books to add to the libraries of their schools.” A board’s discretion, the court held, was only constrained by the principle “that local school boards may not remove books from school library shelves simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those books.” Thus, schools can legally remove books over concern about language or content, as long as the action isn’t motivated by a desire to suppress the book’s ideas.

Those angered by decisions to remove books are still likely to sue. After all, litigation can be useful for generating publicity and applying political pressure, even if a case never makes it to court. For instance, in February 2022 the American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri sued the Wentzville School District because the school board had decided to remove eight books, including Toni Morrison’s The Bluest Eye, from school libraries. The ACLU accused the board of removing the books “because of the ideological disagreement members of the District’s school board and certain vocal community members have with the ideas and viewpoints that the books express.” In its filing, however, the ACLU did not provide any evidence that the four board members who voted to remove the books were in fact motivated by a desire to discriminate based on viewpoint. Instead, the ACLU pointed to the alleged viewpoint-based motivations of parents who complained about the books. Even then, the evidence they cited only showed concerns about graphic depictions of sex, incest, and rape. Unless the ACLU could find other evidence of an attempt to discriminate based on viewpoint, the decision was almost certainly within the board’s authority. Even so, the board reversed its decision to ban Morrison’s book after the lawsuit was filed—proving that litigation can get results even if it might not prevail in court. The board did leave the bans on the other books in place, at least for the time being.

While school boards have significant authority, the Wentzville case reveals the fraught nature of these choices. Just because a board can remove a book does not necessarily mean it should. If the standard is graphic depictions of sex, or rape, or incest, then it is only a matter of time before someone calls for the Bible to be banned. And if a school district obliges, you can be certain that someone will sue.

Joshua Dunn is professor of political science and director of the Center for the Study of Government and the Individual at the University of Colorado Colorado Springs.

This article appeared in the Summer 2022 issue of Education Next. Suggested citation format:

Dunn, J. (2022). Suits Challenging Book “Banning” May Be Better Politics than Law. Education Next, 22(3), 6-7.

The post Suits Challenging Book “Banning” May Be Better Politics than Law appeared first on Education Next.

]]>
49715233